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RICE V PALADIN ENTERPRISES: WHY HIT MAN IS
BEYOND THE PALE
BETH A. FAGAN*

INTRODUCTION

On the night of March 3, 1993, Mildred Horn, her eight-year-old
quadriplegic son, Trevor, and his nurse, Janice Saunders, were
brutally murdered by James Perry, a contract killer.1 Lawrence Horn,
Mildred's ex-husband and Trevor's father, hired Perry to kill the
family to inherit Trevor's substantial trust.,
In planning and
committing the murders, Perry methodically followed the graphic
instructions he had read in the book Hit Man: A Technical Manualfor
Independent Contractors ("Hit Man"), published by Paladin Press
("Paladin"). The victims' families sued Paladin in federal court for
wrongful death on the theory that Paladin had aided and abetted the
murders of their loved ones by supplying Perry's training for the
crimes.
In considering Paladin's motion for summary judgment, the
district court applied the test of Brandenburg v. Ohio which enables
the government to limit subversive speech only where it is intended to
incite imminent lawless action and is likely to do so.3 Under
Brandenburg, the court found that the First Amendment protected
Paladin. The Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for trial,
holding that Brandenburg did not apply to Hit Man and that the First
Amendment did not prevent finding Paladin liable to the victims'
families.,
* J.D. candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, 2001;
B.A., History, University of Virginia, 1996. I would like to thank Professor Steven J. Heyman
for sharing his knowledge, insight, and boundless enthusiasm with me. I would also like to
thank Eacata Gregory for her editorial assistance and Daniel Cammarata for his support and
encouragement.
1. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239-42 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523
U.S. 1074 (1998); ROD SMOLLA, DELIBERATE INTENT at ix (1999).

2. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 239-42.
3. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
4. The last day before beginning the trial, the parties agreed to a settlement that required
Paladin to pay millions of dollars in compensation, to contribute to charitable organizations, and
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This Comment will argue that Brandenburg does not apply to Hit
Man or other similar criminal instruction manuals, and that another
test is needed to balance our need for safety against our desire to
protect free speech. Hit Man should not receive First Amendment
protection because traditional rationales for free speech do not
warrant protection for a criminal instruction manual like Hit Man.
Part I will discuss the Brandenburg decision and the First
Amendment background leading to it. Part II will outline the facts,
arguments, and issues raised by the Rice case and discuss the district
and appellate court decisions. Part III will evaluate the Brandenburg
test's inability to appropriately analyze criminal instruction manuals
because of their lack of value and danger to society. Part IV will
describe four potential approaches that balance social needs for
safety against individual rights of free expression. This Comment will
conclude by suggesting an alternative standard for analyzing First
Amendment protection of Hit Man and other criminal instruction
manuals. The proposed standard can account for the deliberate
intent of culpable defendants like Paladin and yet avoid chilling
effects on the media as a whole.
I.

HISTORY OF SUPREME COURT TREATMENT OF ADVOCACY OF
ILLEGAL ACTION: STRIKING A BALANCE IN.THE BRANDENBURG

TEST

During the past century, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
grappled with the issue presented here: how society and courts can
balance the need for social order against the desire for protecting
speech.5 Before attempting to answer this question in Brandenburg,
the Supreme Court had applied several tests to analyze speech that,
6
like Hit Man, promotes illegal conduct.
A.

The Precursorsto Brandenburg

The issue of advocacy of illegal conduct originally arose from
criticisms of American involvement in World War I and the ensuing

to remove Hit Man from the market. See SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 272.
5. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 802
(1997). Note at this point that while some Justices have advocated an absolute protection of
speech and others have promoted no protection for subversive advocacy, the Court has never
adopted either extreme approach. See id.

6. See id.
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fear of governmental overthrow in the United States.' Amidst this
tense wartime background, the Supreme Court upheld several
convictions brought under the Espionage Act of 1917 and the
Sedition Act of 1918.8 Beginning with the decision in Schenck v.
United States, the Court applied Justice Holmes' formulation of the
clear and present danger test to analyze subversive advocacy. 9 This
test seemed to require a showing that the speech created a likely
danger of causing imminent significant harm that a legislative body
could prohibit. 10 In Schenck, the defendants circulated leaflets
arguing that the drafting of soldiers violated the Thirteenth
Amendment prohibition against involuntary servitude and urged a
repeal of the Conscription Act.1' Although the leaflets did not
encourage any unlawful activity, nor had any resulted from their
distribution, the Court found them to be outside the protection of the
First Amendment and upheld the defendants' convictions. 2
In practice, the clear and present danger test proved to be
malleable and unprotective of speech. 13 Justice Holmes conceded in
Schenck that although individuals normally might have a right to free
expression, that right was not absolute and did not "protect speech
that endangered other social interests. 1 14 This approach suggested an
implicit balancing between social and individual interests. 5 In
affirming the convictions in Schenck and in relying heavily on the
wartime circumstances, the Court seemed to find that the seriousness
of the threat to the social interests simply outweighed the individuals'
rights to free expression.6 The Court continued to use the clear and
present danger test in other Espionage Act cases after Schenck,
7. See id. at 803.
8. See id.
9. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919). Although the language of the clear and present danger test
seems highly speech-protective and was later interpreted to be so, the test originally was used
"to justify results highly restrictive of free speech interests." Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of
Unlawful Conduct and the FirstAmendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger,70 CAL. L.
REV. 1159, 1166 (1982). The test did not acquire a protectionist interpretation until the Court's
decision in Whitney v. California,274 U.S. 357 (1927). See Redish, supra, at 1170-71.
10. See Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5,at 805.
11. See 249 U.S. at 50-51.
12. See id. at 51-53.
13. See David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1205, 1260-65 (1983).
14. Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry into the Foundationsand Limits of
Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1301 (1998).
15. See id.
16. See 249 U.S. at 52. "We admit that in many places and in ordinary times the defendants
in saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But
the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done." Id.
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tipping the balance in favor of social interests and permitting
punishment for speech that advocated unlawful activity. 17

During the 1920s and 1930s, the Court moved from the initial
clear and present danger approach to a highly deferential
reasonableness review test. 18 The Court considered protection of
subversive advocacy in several cases involving convictions under
criminal syndicalism statutes created by legislatures. 19 In developing
the reasonableness approach in Gitlow v. New York, 0 the Court held

that "[e]very presumption is to be indulged in favor of the validity of
the statute.

' 21

Thus, in Whitney v. California,22 the Court upheld

Whitney's conviction for attending an organizational meeting for a
potential branch of the Communist Labor Party because legislative
determinations on the use of police power "must be given great
weight. '23
In these cases, the Court deferred to legislative
determinations in recognition that elected representatives had
already balanced social and personal interests when debating and

creating the syndicalism statutes.
From this reasonableness approach, the Court developed a more
speech-protective form of the clear and present danger test, stressing
that only imminent harm would permit limitations on speech. The
stricter analysis stemmed from Justice Holmes's and Brandeis's
earlier fiery opinions.
In his Abrams dissent, Justice Holmes
presented his marketplace of ideas theory, arguing that the best way

for society to determine truth and identify the ultimate good is a free
trade in ideas. 24 Justice Holmes stated that the Court should protect
expression, even that which is hated and feared, up until the point

that the speech "imminently threaten[s] immediate interference" with
the law. 25

In their Whitney concurrence, Justices Brandeis and

17. See Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (applying the clear and present
danger test to uphold the conviction of a German language newspaper publisher for criticizing
the war); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (applying the clear and present danger test
to uphold Debs's conviction); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (using the clear and
present danger test to uphold the convictions of immigrants who distributed leaflets opposing
the deployment of American troops in Europe).
18. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 806.
19. See id. Criminal syndicalism laws generally prohibited advocating violence or force to
accomplish "change in industrial ownership, or control, or political change." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 712 (6th ed. 1990).
20. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
21. Id. at 668.
22. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
23. Id. at 371.
24. See 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
25. Id. at 630.
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Holmes emphasized that free speech was essential to democratic selfgovernment in the United States. Justice Brandeis instructed that
"[o]nly an emergency can justify repression" because, in a
nonemergency situation, continued free speech could sway citizens to
consider alternate views and lead to better decision making. 26 Justices
Holmes and Brandeis seemed to agree that when balancing interests,
individual rights should trump social interests until their exercise
imminently and seriously threatened social interests, leaving no time
for rationale discourse on the matter.
The Court continued to use the clear and present danger test
through the tumultuous McCarthyism era. In Dennis v. United
States,27 the Court adopted an altered version of the clear and present
danger test called the "risk formula approach." 8 This test considered
"whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability,
justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary to avoid the
danger. ' 29 In Dennis, the Court applied this test to the defendants'
teaching of Marxist-Leninist doctrine and their intent to initiate
revolution in the United States. 30 The Court found that because the
violent overthrow of government would be an enormous harm, the
government could act to prevent that evil, regardless of the lack of
imminence or likelihood of its ever occurring."
B.

The Brandenburg Test for Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct

The Supreme Court announced the current test for the
protection of speech that advocates illegal activity in the landmark
Brandenburg v. Ohio decision in 1969.32 In that case, a television
reporter had filmed Clarence Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan organizer
in Ohio, speaking at a small rally and had recorded several of his
derogatory and "revengent" comments. 33 Brandenburg was later
convicted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act for advocating
illegal activity as a means of accomplishing industrial or political
reform and for assembling with a group of people to teach such
26. 274 U.S. at 362.
27. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
2& See id. at 510 (specifically adopting Judge Learned Hand's rule from the lower court's
decision); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 806.
29. 341 U.S. at 510 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (1918)).
30. See id. at 497.
31. See id. at 509-10.
32. See 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
33. Id. at 445-47.
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doctrines.34 Brandenburg challenged the constitutionality of the Ohio
statute as violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 35 The
Supreme Court held that a state could not constitutionally prohibit
advocacy of law violation "except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action. 36 Under the Brandenburgtest, speech will not
be protected if it (1) intentionally (2) promotes imminent illegal
activity and (3) is likely to produce such acts.37 Applying the new test,
the Court struck down the Ohio statute because it failed to
distinguish between mere advocacy and "incitement to imminent
lawless action. 38
Although the Court advanced this highly speech-protective test,
it failed to sufficiently explain the basis for the rule. Because the
Brandenburg test marked a departure from previous tests, none of
the cases cited within the opinion technically supported the new
rule. 39 For example, the Court relied on Noto v. United States40 to
emphasize the distinction between mere advocacy and incitement to
lawless action. However, the Noto decision does not help explain
why the Court subsequently felt the need to change the test for
advocacy of illegal conduct in Brandenburg.41
Not only was the basis for the new rule unclear at the time, but
the Supreme Court has barely addressed the test since Brandenburg,
thereby leaving great uncertainty for lower courts in its proper
application. 42 Two subsequent cases, Hess v. Indiana43 and NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware,44 did little to clarify the meaning and scope of
the Brandenburg requirements. 45 In Hess, the Court found that the
defendant's call to fellow demonstrators that they should "take the
fucking street later" was protected under the First Amendment. 46
The Court emphasized the need for imminence, holding that at the
very most, the defendant had advocated an illegal act at some
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

See id. at 444-45.
See id. at 445.
Id. at 447.
See id. at 447-49; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 813.
Brandenburg,395 U.S. at 448-49.
See id. at 447-49.
367 U.S. 290 (1961).
See id.
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 813-14.
414 U.S. 105 (1973).
458 U.S. 886 (1982).
See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 813-14.
414 U.S. at 107-08.
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indefinite future time.47 Hess seemed to indicate that "imminence"
refers to a very short time span after the advocacy. In Claiborne
Hardware, the Court reaffirmed constitutional protection for mere
advocacy as opposed to intentional incitement. 48 The NAACP had
engaged in a boycott of white-owned business and was then held
liable for damages. 49 The Mississippi Supreme Court's determination
of liability was grounded largely in the statement of an NAACP
leader that "[i]f we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores,
we're gonna break your damn neck."50 The Supreme Court held that
this speech was protected under the First Amendment because it was
simply advocacy of the use of force and involved no evidence that the
speaker's actual intent was to cause imminent violence." While these
cases affirmed the Court's highly protective analysis of speech under
Brandenburg,they failed to clarify how to apply the test.52
Against this background, it becomes clear that the Brandenburg
test, like its predecessors, reflects the inherent balancing of individual
and societal interests. The Court in Brandenburg,in establishing the
most speech-protective test in United States history, required three
stringent elements, all of which must be met in order to repress
speech. Brandenburg strikes the balance in favor of individual
expression, protecting it up until the point where it threatens societal
interests and where the threat cannot be eliminated with continued
discourse.

II. RICE V. PALADIN ENTERPRISES, INC.
The facts and issues in Rice posed new challenges to the
interpretation and application of the Brandenburg test. The district
court refused to stray from Brandenburg despite a truly novel
situation that the test simply cannot accommodate. The district court
dismissed plaintiffs' civil aiding and abetting claim, but the Fourth
Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment. Before determining
the level of First Amendment protection that Hit Man deserves, an
evaluation of the facts, arguments, and issues of Rice is necessary.
47. Id. at 108-09.
48. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
49. See id. at 888-906.
50. Id. at 900-02.
51. See id. at 927-28.
52. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 814; see also KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND THE USES OF LANGUAGE 209 (1989) (discussing a lack of clarity in Hess to analyze
greater spans of time as "imminent").
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The Cold Hard Facts: The ContractMurders

Trevor Horn and his twin sister, Tamielle, were born
prematurely into the troubled family of Mildred and Lawrence
Horn. 3 Because of his precarious health, Trevor frequently needed
hospital treatment; during one hospital stay, his breathing tube was
accidentally dislodged, depriving his brain of oxygen and causing
permanent brain damage. 4 Trevor recovered approximately two
million dollars in settlement from the hospital, kept in a trust, to
compensate for his injuries and provide for his constant care.55
Shortly after the birth of the twins, Lawrence and Mildred Horn
bitterly divorced. 6 Lawrence Horn moved to Los Angeles, ignored
his son Trevor, eventually lost his job with Motown Records, and
grew in desperate need of money.57 Horn knew that under the trust's
terms, he would receive the two million dollars if both Mildred and
Trevor died.5"
Meanwhile, in Detroit in January 1992, budding contract killer
James Perry ordered the books that would enable him to murder
Horn's family: Hit Man and How to Make a Disposable Silencer,
Volume II, both published by Paladin.5 9 Perry meticulously followed
the detailed instructions found in Hit Man for soliciting and planning
the brutal murders of Mildred, Trevor, and Trevor's nurse, Janice
Saunders. 60 Perry solicited his contract with Horn through a personal
friend, as recommended in Hit Man.61 Hit Man suggested that the
contract killer should receive between five hundred and five thousand
dollars in expense money; Perry demanded three thousand five
hundred dollars in advance of the murders from Horn. 62 Perry killed
Mildred, Trevor, and Janice at the Horn residence, which Hit Man
preached to be the ideal location for a hit. 63 Obeying Hit Man's

53. See SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 6.
54. See id.
55. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 239 (4th Cir. 1997); SMOLLA, supra note
1, at 6-7, 20.
56. See SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 20.
57. See id. at 20-21.
58. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 239.
59. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836 (S.D. Md. 1996), rev'd, 128 F.3d 233
(4th Cir. 1997). Although Perry bought both books, this Comment will only discuss Perry's
reliance upon Hit Man.
60. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 239.
61. See id.
62. See id. at 239-40.
63. See id. at 240.
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directions, Perry drove a rental car with license tags that were stolen
from an out-of-state vehicle, rented a motel room near the murder
site, and registered at the motel with a false license tag number. 64 Hit

Man orchestrated Perry's selection and preparation of his weapons;
he used an AR-7 rifle, with completely drilled out serial numbers and

65
with a homemade silencer he constructed using the manual's lessons.

Perry also followed Hit Man's suggestions while actually
murdering the three victims. For example, Hit Man directed that

victims be shot two or three times through the eyes from a distance of
three to six feet to avoid splattering blood; Perry shot both Mildred
and Janice in this fashion. 66 After killing the three victims, 67 Perry
collected the spent bullet cartridges, as the manual instructed. 68 He

took credit cards and jewelry and moved some furniture to make
burglary appear to be the killer's motive. 69 Perry even disassembled
his rifle and scattered pieces of the gun, now untraceable, 70 along the
road, in compliance with Hit Man's orders.7

Perry and Horn were convicted for the murders in separate
criminal trials. 72 The relatives of Mildred and Trevor Horn and of
Janice Saunders subsequently filed a civil wrongful death action
against Paladin in federal district court. 73 Paladin quickly moved for

64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.
67. Though he shot Mildred and Janice, Perry's original plan for murdering Trevor was
simply to unhook the boy's respirator. However, that action triggered the respirator's loud
beeping alarm, and Perry then smothered the defenseless eight year old. See SMOLLA, supra
note 1, at 70-71.
68. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 240 (4th Cir. 1997).
69. See id. at 241.
70. Although the manual promised Perry impunity, he and Horn would not escape the law.
The Montgomery County, Maryland, police immediately suspected that the crimes committed
at the Horn residence were murders "masquerading as burglary." SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 1112. The police investigation quickly revealed the Horn family history and Lawrence's position
as beneficiary of Trevor's trust. See id. at 16-17. The police linked Horn to Perry with the
testimony of the friend who had introduced the two men, with phone call records, with wire
transfer records, and with maps and videotapes of Mildred's neighborhood and home. See id. at
22-25, 40-41. Hit Man provided the linchpin for the prosecution's case in Perry's murder trial,
serving as the "blueprint" of the crimes. Id. at 65-67. The jury convicted Perry and sentenced
him to death by lethal injection. See id. at 72. In a separate trial, a jury found Lawrence Horn
guilty on three counts of murder, and, sparing his life, sentenced him to life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole. See id. at 83; Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836,
838 (S.D. Md. 1996).
71. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 240.
72. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838; SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 72, 83.
73. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
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summary judgment, arguing that it could not be held liable because its
74
books were protected by the First Amendment.
B.

The District Court'sAnalysis of Rice

The plaintiffs based their state-law wrongful death suit largely on
the theory that Paladin had aided and abetted Perry in murdering
Mildred, Trevor, and Janice by instructing and encouraging him to
commit the crimes.75 Under Maryland law, a defendant may be held
liable for aiding and abetting the commission of a tort where that
person "by any means (words, signs, or motions) encouraged, incited,
aided or abetted the act of the direct perpetrator of the tort. ' 7 6 To
satisfy the elements for aiding and abetting, the defendant must have
(1) helped a person who performed a wrongful act, causing injury,
(2) known his or her role as part of the illegal or tortious activity at
the time of the assistance, and (3) knowingly and substantially
assisted in the principal violation that caused injury.77 The Rice
plaintiffs argued that Paladin assisted Perry with the murders by
encouraging him and directing his actions and that Paladin knew such
a result would occur if the Hit Man instructions were followed.
In response to the plaintiff's wrongful death claim, Paladin filed a
motion for summary judgment and agreed to a number of remarkable
factual stipulations.7 8 For purposes of that motion, Paladin admitted
to facts that showed, as a matter of law, that the publisher was liable
for aiding and abetting-unless the First Amendment protected the
publisher.7 9 Furthermore, Paladin stipulated that it had intended to
attract criminals and would-be criminals seeking information on how
to commit crimes.8 0 Paladin also admitted that it had intended for
readers to use Hit Man in actually planning and executing contract
murders.8 1 The publisher even stipulated that it did, in fact, aid and

74. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 838.
75. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 241. The plaintiffs also brought claims in negligence and strict
liability, but neither the district court nor the appellate court considered them. The appellate
court remanded the issues back to the district court in its decision. See id. at 248 n.4.
76. Alleco, Inc. v. Harry and Jeanette Weinberg Found., Inc., 665 A.2d 1038, 1049 (1995)
(quoting Duke v. Feldman, 226 A.2d 345, 347 (1967)).
77. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (imposing civil liability for
murder on the aiding and abetting theory). Note that this action for aiding and abetting does
not require a showing of but-for causation as with negligence claims.
78. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997).
79. See id.
80. See id.
81. See id.

20001

WHY HIT MAN IS BEYOND THE PALE

abet Perry in the murders, by publishing and selling Hit Man.82
With this important First Amendment issue before it, the district
court applied the standard established in Brandenburg.83 The Rice

plaintiffs argued that Brandenburg did not apply to the facts of the
case, and alternatively, even if the standard did apply, that Hit Man

was not entitled to protection as mere advocacy. 84 However, the
district court found that Brandenburg analysis was appropriate and

had been used in other cases involving nonpolitical speech.85 The
court also held that Hit Man constituted mere advocacy because the

book did not urge or command a reader to commit murder at any
time, much less immediately, nor did it have the likelihood of
86

producing such violence.
In holding Hit Man to be constitutionally protected speech, the

district court summarily rejected several of the plaintiff's logical
arguments, despite the supporting legal precedent. The court
dismissed the claim that the First Amendment does not protect
speech that aids and abets the commission of crimes. 87 The court

rejected the argument that because the First Amendment fails to
82. See id. The stipulations agreed upon by Paladin truly were "extraordinary." Id. at 242.
In his book, Smolla articulates several possible reasons why Paladin might have agreed to these
facts. First, he notes that Paladin may have hoped to dispose of the case early rather than
possibly losing a jury trial. Second, Smolla expresses the theory that Paladin, as a publisher,
likely had confidence that the First Amendment would protect its work. See SMOLLA, supra
note 1, at 118-20. The ultimate purpose of the stipulations was to narrow the issue before the
district court; the parties agreed that the only remaining issue was "whether the First
Amendment is a complete defense" to the plaintiffs' claims. Rice, 128 F.3d at 241.
83. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 844-49 (S.D. Md. 1996). The district
court initially granted Paladin's motion for summary judgment because the court mistakenly
believed that Maryland did not recognize a civil tort for aiding and abetting. See Rice v. Paladin
Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997); SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 145. The court then
issued a revised opinion to acknowledge the well-established tort, but still failed to remove all
references to its first decision concerning the existence of a civil tort of aiding and abetting. See
Rice, 128 F.3d at 250-51; Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 843 ("Rather, Plaintiffs are asking the Court to
allow the Defendants to be subject to civil liability for murder, based on a theory of civil aiding
and abetting- a claim that does not exist under Maryland law.").
84. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 844-48.
85. See id. at 845-46.
86. See id. at 847-48.
87. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 842-43. The district court did not find the criminal cases
presented by the plaintiffs to be binding or persuasive authority. See United States v. Barnett,
667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Buttorff, 572 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1978). In Barnett,
the court held that defendant's printed instructions for the manufacture of PCP were not
protected by the First Amendment, as a matter of law, simply because he had used "the printed
word in encouraging and counseling others in the commission of a crime." 667 F.2d at 843. In
Buttorff, the defendants were convicted of aiding and abetting people who had filed fraudulent
or false tax returns by addressing the group on various ways to avoid paying taxes. 572 F.2d at
624. The court held that the speech was not entitled to First Amendment protection, as it went
"beyond mere advocacy of tax reform," although it did not necessarily incite imminent lawless
activity. Id.
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protect knowing and reckless speech that injures reputation, under

New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan,8 then it surely could not protect

knowing and reckless conduct that injures or destroys human life. 89
The district court also found that the analogous Soldier of Fortune

cases, 90 where that magazine had been held liable for deaths resulting
from various "gun for hire" advertisements, were irrelevant because
they had involved commercial speech.9 1
C.

The Fourth Circuit'sAnalysis of Rice

The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary
judgment, finding liability for Paladin's speech under a civil aiding
and abetting theory as analogous to speech that constitutes criminal
aiding and abetting, which does not enjoy First Amendment
protection.9 2 The circuit court relied on the principle that "provision
of instructions that aid and abet another in the commission of a
criminal offense" is not protected by the First Amendment, as seen in
United States v. Barnett.93 In that case, defendant Gary Barnett was
charged with aiding and abetting after selling detailed instructions on

how to manufacture synthetic drugs. 94 The Ninth Circuit held that
Barnett was not immune from search or prosecution just because he
used printed words to encourage

and counsel others in the

commission of crimes.95
Relying on Barnett, the Fourth Circuit in Rice found that
Brandenburgdid not apply at all to Hit Man because the speech was

such a truly "integral part of the crime." 96 If the First Amendment

88. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Supreme Court held that publications could be held liable to
a public official if a libelous statement about that official was made with "actual malice,"
meaning that either it was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard of its
validity. Id. at 279-80.
89. The district court held simply that the holding of the libel case in New York Times had
no relevance to Rice. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 940 F. Supp. 836, 843-44 (S.D. Md. 1996).
90. The Soldier of Fortune cases noted by the plaintiffs consist of two cases where courts
held the magazine liable and rejected the First Amendment defense. See, e.g., Braun v. Soldier
of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1071 (1993);
Norwood v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 651 F. Supp. 1397 (W.D. Ark. 1987).
91. See Rice, 940 F. Supp. at 848. Coincidentally, Robert Brown, the creator of Soldier of
Fortune magazine, was the original founder of Paladin. He subsequently became business
partners with Peter Lund, the owner of Paladin and the defendant in this case. See SMOLLA,
supra note 1, at 76, 109.
92. See Rice, 128 F.3d 233, 242-43 (4th Cir. 1997).
93. Id. at 245. See United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1982).
94. See Barnett,667 F.2d at 838-41.
95. See id. at 843. The court also noted that the government would not have to show that
Barnett had actually met the manufacturers to prove the aiding and abetting charge. See id.
96. Rice, 128 F.3d at 245.
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did limit regulation of such speech, the government would be unable
to prosecute numerous crimes and provide for various civil torts. 97 In
support, the court cited a Department of Justice report which noted
that the Brandenburg imminence requirement does not apply to
speech constituting criminal aiding and abetting. 98 The report
submitted that an actor's culpability in such cases hinges on
"successful efforts to assist" others by providing the means of
committing a crime, not on the defendant's advocacy of the criminal
behavior. 99
The Fourth Circuit then considered two possible qualifications to
its decision that the First Amendment would not protect civil aiding
and abetting. 1°° First, the court recognized that the First Amendment
may require a showing of heightened intent, rather than mere
knowledge or foreseeability, to permit liability. 10 1 The court insisted,
however, that the First Amendment did not bar the imposition of civil
liability for speech that the plaintiff can demonstrate was performed
with specific intent. 1°2 In applying this principle to the facts of Rice,
the court noted that a jury could easily find such intent in Paladin's
acts, even without considering the publisher's stipulations to both
knowledge and intent that Hit Man would be used by criminals in the
commission of murders-for-hire. 103
The court found that the
requirement of such deliberate intent was appropriate. 1°4 Not only
would an intent requirement sanction liability for those who
intentionally assist crime, but it would also alleviate the pronounced
"concern of those who publish, broadcast, or distribute" that they
could otherwise be subjected to liability. 105
The Fourth Circuit then discussed a second potential
qualification to its ruling, the possibility that the First Amendment

97. See id. at 244.
98. See id. at 246 (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., REPORT ON THE AVAILABILITY OF
BOMBMAKING INFORMATION, THE EXTENT TO WHICH ITS DISSEMINATION IS CONTROLLED
BY FEDERAL LAW, AND THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH DISSEMINATION MAY BE SUBJECT TO
REGULATION CONSISTENT WITH THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1997)

(visited Aug. 26, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cybercrime/bombmakinginfo.html>
[hereinafter DOJ REPORT]).
99. Id.
100. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 247-51 (4th Cir. 1997).
101. See id. at 247-48.
102. See id. at 248.
103. See id. The court also held that even without the stipulation, a jury could reasonably
find that Paladin acted with the requisite intent, allowing for the imposition of liability. Id.
104. See id. at 247-48.
105. Id.
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requires applying the Brandenburg test for the imposition of civil
16
liability for abstract advocacy, as it does for criminal punishment. 0
However, the court held that Hit Man was not advocacy in any way,

but rather was an instructional manual without relevant
"communicative value."' 7 According to the court, the only
communicative merit present in Hit Man is the illegal "value" of

training in the art of murder-for-hire. 108 The court found that Hit Man
consisted of "the teachings of methods of terror," 01 9 and therefore was
' 0
the absolute "antithesis of speech protected under Brandenburg."
After determining that Hit Man was not protected, the court

considered the aiding and abetting claim; it found that the plaintiffs
had established a material issue of fact concerning each element of
their claim, thereby defeating Paladin's summary judgment motion.1 "

Finally, the Fourth Circuit confronted the serious and highly
publicized concern that denying protection to Paladin would cause
"far-reaching chilling effects on the rights of free speech and press.""' 2
The court held that, despite extensive research, the parties and amici
identified no cases analogous to Rice." 3 The court emphasized that its
ruling stemmed from a truly unique case and was unlikely to generate
widespread effects." 4 The Rice decision would not extend liability to
"copycat" cases"t 5 because (1) the broadcaster or publisher in that
106. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 248-49 (4th Cir. 1997).
107. Id.
108. See id.
109. See id. at 249 (quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) ("The freedom to speak is not absolute; the teaching of methods of terror ... should
be beyond the pale .... ")).
110. Rice, 128 F.3d at 249-50.
111. See id. at 250-65. The court held the following evidence supported plaintiffs' claim that
Paladin had aided and abetted Perry in the murders: (1) Paladin's own stipulation that Perry did
follow instructions from the book; (2) even with the stipulated use of the book, the
correspondence of the methods described in the book to the methods faithfully employed by
Perry; (3) the encouragement found in passages of Hit Man, which aim to steel and push the
reader to commit murder; and (4) Paladin's stipulation of intent that would satisfy any
heightened standard imposed by Maryland law or the First Amendment. See id.
112. Rice, 128 F.3d at 265.
113. See id. The Fourth Circuit considered numerous amici briefs for this case, many filed in
support of Paladin by a number of media groups and organizations, such as the American Civil
Liberties Union Foundation; ABC, Inc.; America OnLine, Inc.; The Baltimore Sun Company;
Association of American Publishers; The New York Times; The Washington Post; Magazine
Publishers of America; and Media Professional Insurance.
114. See id.
115. "Copycat" cases involve situations where an actor attempts to imitate criminal or
dangerous activity behavior that was communicated through some type of media, such as
published in a magazine or broadcast on television. Some such actors, or their families, have
sued the media speaker when the actor is injured or killed in the process of imitating the
criminal or dangerous behavior. The courts hearing these cases have traditionally used the
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context surely would not intend to assist in the commission of a crime
and (2) the information provided would have been misused for a

criminal purpose.1' 6 The court also noted that, unlike the situation in
Rice, where the publisher actually stipulated the intent to assist in
murders, rarely would a jury hear evidence that could support the
intent required for a publisher's or broadcaster's liability."7

The

obviously legitimate purposes promoted in some communications,
such as news or political or ideological messages, would negate any

possible intent to assist in the commission of crimes.1 8 The court
acknowledged that not all publishers of instruction manuals should be
denied First Amendment protection-only those that intend to aid in
criminal activity.1 19
III. INSTRUCTION MANUALS AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Court in Brandenburg created a balance between an
individual's need to express high-value political speech and the
societal need to avoid harm. Unlike the speech in Brandenburg and

advocacy situations, criminal instruction manuals have less First
Amendment value than political speech or general
Furthermore, because these manuals generate very

advocacy.
real and

unpredictable harms, Brandenburg is not the appropriate analysis for
striking a balance between individual and social interests.
Brandenburgtest and found the communications to be protected speech. See Herceg v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1987) (holding that the First Amendment protected an
article on autoerotic asphyxia after a mother sued Hustler because her son died during the
sexual practice); Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (holding that the First
Amendment barred the claim that CBS, through violent programming, desensitized the plaintiff
to the extent that he murdered a neighbor); McCollum v. CBS, Inc., 202 Cal. App. 3d 989 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the First Amendment barred plaintiff's claim that defendants Ozzy
Osbourne, CBS Records, and others caused decedent's suicide through production and
distribution of rock music); Olivia N. v. NBC, Inc., 126 Cal. App. 3d 488 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)
(holding that the First Amendment protected a broadcast of "artificial rape" scene during a
television film after several juveniles imitated the scene, injuring the minor plaintiff); Sakon v.
Pepsico, Inc., 553 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1989) (holding that the First Amendment protected a soft
drink ad featuring dangerous behavior after the 14-year-old plaintiff tried the stunt from the ad
and broke his neck); Walt Disney Prods., Inc. v. Shannon, 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981) (holding
that the First Amendment barred the claim where a child attempted to re-create a sound effects
trick seen on the "Mickey Mouse Club" television show and was partially blinded in the
resulting accident); DeFilippo v. NBC, Inc., 446 A.2d 1036 (R.I. 1982) (holding that a late night
talk show demonstration of a hanging was protected, where teenager imitated the stunt and
killed himself).
116. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., 128 F.3d 233, 265 (4th Cir. 1997).
117. See id. at 265-66.
118. See id. at 266.
119. See id. However, the court did note that the Rice decision may not "bode well" for
publishers of instruction manuals whose intentions may be unclear. Id.
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Brandenburg Does Not Apply to CriminalInstruction Manuals

Due to the lack of Supreme Court guidance in applying
Brandenburg,and the fact that a media injury case like Rice has never
reached the Supreme Court, the Brandenburg test has been applied
to all kinds of cases by lower courts. 120 The Brandenburg test simply
does not apply to Hit Man and other criminal instruction manuals
because it is limited to its facts and fails to consider the genuine
21
harms caused by speech.1

1. The Brandenburganalysis must be limited to similar factual

scenarios.
First, Brandenburg involved ideological speech of a political
nature. 2 2 The test formulated in that decision was designed to protect
political speech;2 3 this form of speech has been regarded as the most

valuable

type of expression

throughout the history of First

Amendment jurisprudence because it enables an informed electorate
to make proper decisions. 24 On the contrary, "how-to" manuals, by
their very neutral and instructional nature, do not necessarily
advocate any ideological premise or contain any political
expression. 125 They are not intended, generally, to convince a reader
to advocate a certain proposition or behave in a certain manner.

"How-to" manuals exist to give step-by-step directions for the reader
to accomplish a certain goal, possibly without any effort to convince
120. See Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liabilityfor PhysicalInjuries Allegedly Resulting from Media
Speech: A Comprehensive FirstAmendment Approach, 34 ARIZ. L. REV. 231, 255-62 (1992).
121. See id. at 256. Sims comments that if the Brandenburg test was "read literally and
applied universally in the media physical injury cases, recovery would be barred in almost all
instances." Id.
122. See 395 U.S. 444, 445-49 (1969); Sims, supra note 120, at 257-60.
123. See GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 262. Greenawalt suggests that the Brandenburg
test was intended to protect "ideological advocacy, not every reason that might be given in favor
of an act." Id; see also Amy K. Dilworth, Murder in the Abstract: The FirstAmendment and the
Misappropriationof Brandenburg, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 565, 583-87 (1998). Dilworth
comments that Hit Man contains no ideological message and cites plaintiffs' argument that
"celebrated Supreme Court opinions dealing with such issues as advocacy of violence,
incitement, symbolic speech, and graphic protest have all involved speech pertaining to political
or social issues." Id. at 584 (quoting Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendant Paladin Enterprises,
Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 35, Rice (AW-95-3811)); see also Avital T. Zer-Ilan,
The First Amendment and Murder Manuals, 106 YALE L.J. 2697, 2699-2700 (1997). Zer-Ilan
notes that the Brandenburg test was "obviously intended to make it more difficult for the
government to restrict or suppress political speech." Id. at 2699 (emphasis added).
124. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 752-53; Sims, supra note 120, at 257-60. Some
commentators feel that only political speech is worthy of First Amendment protection. See
Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
125. See Sims, supra note 120, at 256-56, 260.
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the reader of the value of that goal. 2 6 The Brandenburg decision was
intended to protect a form of speech that is not even present in
instruction manuals; the test is inapposite for analyzing "how-to"
speech.
Moreover, the Brandenburg "incitement to imminent lawless
action" test does not apply to Hit Man because the "crowd" context
so crucial to the facts of Brandenburg is not present in the instruction
manual setting.127 Indeed, even the two Supreme Court cases
previously discussed that interpreted the Brandenburg standard
involved crowds and other volatile group situations.12 The two
contexts are dramatically different.
The group dynamic, so
threatening to government control in public settings, is completely
absent in instruction manuals, which are written presentations,
designed even for an audience of one. The strict formulation used in
the Brandenburg, Hess, and Claiborne Hardware cases was tailored
by the Court to analyze those group situations, not instruction books
129
or even private spoken advocacy.
In general, the particular facts of Brandenburg suggest that the
test should to be used for only similar fact patterns. For example, the
Supreme Court of Georgia, in the case of Walt Disney v. Shannon, did
not even apply the Brandenburg test. 130 Rather, the court used the
older clear and present danger test.' The court felt that the clear
and present danger test remained the appropriate standard for
analysis, presumably because Brandenburg's facts limited that test's
usefulness to only similar situations. 31 2
2.

Brandenburgfails to account for the injustices caused by these
manuals.

The Brandenburg formulation overprotects the destructive
speech of criminal instruction manual cases because it fails to

126. Instructional manuals may encourage criminal activity for its own sake, not for
ideological reasons, as seen with Hit Man.
127. See Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1023 (5th Cir. 1987) (noting that
"[tihe root of incitement theory appears to have been grounded in concern over crowd
behavior"); Dilworth, supra note 123, at 583-87.
128. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973).
129. See GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 262.
130. 276 S.E.2d 580 (Ga. 1981).
131. See id. at 582-83.
132 See Sims, supra note 120, at 238-39 n.37.
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consider any actual injury that may have occurred.1 33 Brandenburg
generally represents a limit on governmental power to restrict
advocacy of unlawful activities-but it is "irrelevant whether the
3 4
listeners responded" and whether the illegal acts ever occurred.
The Rice case, and other media physical injury cases, involve plaintiffs
who have already sustained injuries and who seek compensation
under tort law for those very real harms.135 Abstract advocacy should
be protected; but a test designed to protect such advocacy, regardless
of the outcome, cannot be used to shield people who have caused
concrete injury through their expressions or acts. Justice should be
served by transferring the costs incurred by the innocent victims onto
the parties who intentionally brought about the harm and,
36
furthermore, who profited from the situation.
B.

The (Lack of) Value of Hit Man As a CriminalInstruction
Manual

Evaluating Hit Man's constitutional protection demands an
inquiry into its value, and its harms, as speech. Support for Hit Man
among the traditional justifications for free speech determines the
weight of Hit Man's First Amendment interest. The major rationales
for protecting free speech are the (1) marketplace of ideas, (2) selfgovernance, (3) tolerance, (4) social stability and interest
accommodation, and (5) self-realization theories. Hit Man lacks First
Amendment value because none of the justifications underlying the
freedom of speech encompass such a manual.
Protection for Hit Man is not justified by the marketplace of
ideas rationale. This classic rationale promotes the protection of
speech on the grounds that open expression results in the discovery of
truth.137 The crux of this rationale is that a free market will entertain
133. See id. at 260-61.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
LAW 241 (1984).
137. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 753-54. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes adopted
this approach in developing his marketplace of ideas theory. See Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come
down to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.
Id. Holmes's theory is grounded in the works of John Stuart Mill, who had written that limiting
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many ideas; the market will decipher actual truths based on what
notions survive the open exchange.38 Under this truth-discovery
theory, the speech is protected because it actually may be promoting
a truth; however, Hit Man offers no idea to further the search for
truth, it merely offers detailed and graphic instructions on how to
commit murders. The marketplace will not be impoverished by
holding Paladin liable and removing Hit Man from discourse.39
There is no open-market debate to be missed, unless someone wishes
to argue that the AR-7 is not a rifle-of-choice for first-time killers or
that shooting victims through the ears is preferable to aiming for the
eyes. It is difficult to imagine that Hit Man contains any speech that
might promote any truth, let alone a truth worthy of protection, in the
same sense that Mill, Brandeis, and Holmes had envisioned.
Nor do such instruction manuals implicate the self-governance
theory. This rationale promotes free speech as an integral component
of democratic government. 140 The principle of freedom of speech "is
a deduction from the basic American agreement that public issues
shall be decided by universal suffrage. '' 141 This theory fails to protect
expression was tantamount to "robbing the human race." JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY
16-33 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publishing Co., Inc. 1978) (1859). Mill saw great danger
in restraining speech because a certain opinion may be wrongly suppressed by leaders who are
imperfect and who have no right to judge on behalf of all human beings what people should
judge for themselves. See id. Furthermore, Mill, and subsequently Holmes, felt that discussion
of a false opinion would manifest its inconstancies and, over time, could produce the truth. See
id.; GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 17.
138. See MILL, supra note 137. There are several criticisms to the marketplace of ideas
argument. First, not all ideas receive attention in the marketplace because the speaker lacks
resources that others use to drown out competing voices. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786 (2d ed. 1988). Second, because people often make decisions on
emotional or irrational bases, truth may not win in the marketplace. See C. EDWIN BAKER,
HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 12 (1989). Third, some scholars have criticized
the theory because we have no proof that an objective truth actually exists. See Stanley Ingber,
The Marketplace of Ideas: A Legitimizing Myth, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1, 25. Although the
marketplace of ideas rationale has been criticized, it continues to carry significant weight.
Commentators in defense of this theory have pointed out that the alternative to such a state
would be to allow a fallible, and often self-interested, government to determine for its citizens
what is true and to suppress all other ideas. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 754;
GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 20.
139. See SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 271.
140. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 752; GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 28-29.
141. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
15-16, 24-27, 39 (1948). This theory presupposes that free discussion of issues will generate
more informed electoral decisions by voting citizens, more responsible representation by leaders
aware of constituent interests, and a check on abuses of power by government officials by
forcing accountability. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 752; GREENAWALT, supra note 52,
at 28. Furthermore, open communication about political views or injustices can enhance the
sense of participation and personal significance in the political process, thereby "reliev[ing]
frustration about an undesired course of political events." GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 29.
For a discussion of this "checking" function of free speech, see Vincent Blasi, The Checking
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Hit Man because the manual contains no mention of politics, the

functioning of government, elected officials, elections, or any issue
whatsoever prevalent in American politics. Hit Man advocates
nothing; it promotes no ideological beliefs or political convictions.' 42

Only an implicit condoning of murderous vigilantism, as a logical
boost to the hit man's career, could somewhat ironically appear to
concern issues of self-governance. Training and steeling of murderers
simply "does not advance the rule of law or contribute to the
143
deliberative processes of democracy.

The "tolerance in society" rationale, which has become
increasingly important in our modern society, is premised on the
theory that tolerance itself is an extremely valuable characteristic of a
society, particularly for a diverse culture as found in the United
States.144 This rationale suggests that because a principle of free
speech forces recognition of all citizens' rights to express themselves,
people learn to be more tolerant of differing behaviors and

opinions.145 However, in the Hit Man situation, society is expected to
protect this instruction manual that enables the commission of crimes
that society has specifically refused to tolerate.

Society does not

prohibit these acts, or deny protection to the expression detailing
them, because they are simply unpopular or distasteful. 146 It forbids

murder and torture as crimes because they are abhorrent and
unacceptable for life in a civilized culture.

It is illogical to force

toleration of nonideological instruction about the commission of
these crimes when society will not tolerate the acts themselves. Hit
Man does not require society to recognize the differing opinions of
others, but rather to sanction the training of potential murderers.

Value in FirstAmendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521.
142. See Dilworth, supra note 123, at 584.
143. SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 271.
144. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 755-56; GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 29. For
an eminent work on this rationale, see LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY:
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986). Amazingly, this basic
claim has been attacked by those who question the value of tolerance. See David A. Strauss,
Why Be Tolerant?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1485 (1986) (reviewing LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE
TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986)).
145. See GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 29. This ambitious justification seeks to "shape
the intellectual character of the society." BOLLINGER, supra note 144, at 9-10, 107.
146. In fact, the government cannot suppress speech simply because "society finds the idea
itself offensive or disagreeable." Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (holding that
defendant's criminal conviction for flag burning violates the First Amendment). See, e.g.,
Hustler, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55-56 (1988); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46
(1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1976), United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382
(1968).
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When this theory states that protecting free speech will promote
tolerance, the corollary of that proposition must be that a limitation
on speech will discourage tolerance. But with Hit Man the only
tolerance discouraged is tolerance for criminal acts and the
expressions that aid in the commission of those acts.
Similar to the tolerance justification, a fourth explanation for
protecting free speech emphasizes the way that speech can increase
social stability and interest accommodation." 47
Free expression
enables decision makers to more accurately evaluate the interests at
stake in a given situation, allowing them to fairly accommodate and
balance those interests.148 Hit Man does not implicate this rationale
because it does not discuss political interests or offer any input to
political leaders. As seen with the self-governance rationale analysis,
Hit Man actually promotes an unstable society by educating contract
killers on how to engage in the criminal business of murder and
vigilantism. Crime produces a more unsettled society where people
may not only feel unsafe and threatened, but also feel that
governmental processes are failing to protect them.
The only hope for protection for Hit Man lies in the selfrealization rationale that focuses on the individual value of speech
and the importance of autonomy and self-expression in our human
existence. 149

This rationale for free speech

values the human

expression itself as important, rather than just as a means to political
ends or truth-discovery.5 0 Although this justification appreciates Hit
Man for its own sake, it still fails to support such manuals. In a broad
147. See GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 25.
148. See id. A failure to accommodate as many interests as possible may lead to frustration
from those not accounted for. See id. Free speech cannot alleviate all such indignation;
however, it does at least offer the opportunity to participate in the political process. See id.
Perhaps knowing that continued political action may bring change and recognition will prevent
groups from seeking radical changes outside existing governmental structures. See id.
149. Professor Redish maintains that the only value underlying the First Amendment is this
self-realization theory. See Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591
(1982).
150. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 755. A principle of free speech encourages
individual development in several ways. An open environment will expose citizens to numerous
ideas and leave decision making to the individual; such respect from a government and
responsibility promotes "independent judgment." GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 26-27, 3132. This enhanced autonomy, as opposed to a condition of suppression, enables people to select
lifestyles they find personally fulfilling and to exercise their independence in self-expression.
See id. at 26-27. The capability for free expression enables people to define themselves by their
communicated beliefs and actions. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 754-55. For an example
of how speech can be self-definitional, see C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment
Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 994 (1978) (describing how a Vietnam protestor
defines herself by participating in demonstration).
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sense, Hit Man could be worthy of protection solely because the
author, "Rex Feral," wanted to share instructions and exhortations
for murder and should be permitted to feel satisfaction from
expressing herself. 5 '
But this self-realization rationale cannot seriously justify
protection of Hit Man because the manual "can stake no plausible
claim to the nourishment of the human spirit.' 152 Protecting Hit Man
under this rationale "ignores the ways in which protecting freedom of
speech for some can undermine the autonomy and self-fulfillment of
'
others."153
Not all speech is, nor should be, protected because of the
harms the speech inflicts on the lives of other citizens. Rex Feral may
be thrilled to see her work in print and to inform would-be killers on
the techniques of murder. Yet, the murder victims and their families
(not to mention society) suffer tangible, traumatic, and life-altering
injuries from that same expression. The expression in Hit Man
undeniably infringes on the rights of others in irreversible ways, even
more tangibly than hate speech or pornography may affect people.
Though some scholars might still argue Hit Man's inherent
"value" and demand its immunity, the Supreme Court itself has never
required that such detailed training, like the instructions in Hit Man,
be considered valuable and protected. Justice Douglas's comment in
the Dennis case makes this point quite clearly. Douglas commented
that if the Dennis facts had consisted of the teaching of "the
techniques of sabotage, the assassination of the President... the
planting of bombs, the art of street warfare, and the like" then he
would easily have found the defendants' expression to be
unprotected. 15 4 Douglas continued, stating that "the teaching of
methods of terror and other seditious conduct should be beyond the
pale along with obscenity and immorality.' 15 5 Douglas may have been
contemplating more large-scale terrorist activity;'56 but what could
instill more terror in an individual (and a community) than being
151. "Rex Feral" is, in fact, not a hit man at all, but a female author. She originally wrote to
Paladin, proposing a fictional book on a hit man's life. Paladin suggested that she write in the
instructional "how-to" format. In addition, Paladin and the author agreed that Paladin would
indemnify her from liability for any litigation resulting from the use or misuse of Hit Man. See
SMOLLA, supra note 1, 229-35.
152. Id. at 271.
153. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 5, at 755. Other examples of this criticism include the
regulations of hate speech and pornography as those forms of expression may demean, or
infringe on the rights of, people other than the speaker. See id.
154. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 581 (1951).
155. Id.
156. See GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 247 n.13.
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gunned down in your private home in the middle of the night by a
paid assassin? The scale may not reach the horrors of an airplane or
federal building explosion, but the premise holds true. Detailed
training for such criminal acts is simply not entitled to First
Amendment protection.
Similarly, Professor Kent Greenawalt comments that training, if
clearly for criminal activities, is not protected by the First
Amendment, even when the speaker "talks only in factual terms
about how to accomplish a given objective."' 157 Thomas Emerson
noted that while "advice or persuasion" to promote crime would be
protected, conduct that constitutes "instructions or preparations" may
not. 158 If the speaker in this instructive capacity has the actual intent
that the listener commit the crime, that speaker should be punishable
and liable under the law. 15 9 Because the speaker's subjective intent is
to facilitate a crime, the communicative value of that expression is
"relatively slight," and raises no serious First Amendment claim.16°
Furthermore, because the threat caused by "crime-aiding
information" may linger for a length of time, no Brandenburg-like
requirement for imminent action should apply.' 6' In addition, a
speaker should still be punished for widely disseminating information
that facilitates a truly heinous crime, even if only a small segment of
162
the speaker's audience actually acts on the proffered information.
Hit Man, and any criminal instruction manual like it, cannot be
protected by the First Amendment because "the justifications for free
speech that apply to speakers do not reach communications that are
simply means to get a crime successfully committed.' 6' Hit Man
constitutes training for the crime of murder and thus lacks any
significant First Amendment value.
C.

The Harms Threatened in CriminalInstruction Manuals

Having discerned the little deference due to Hit Man's value, its
potential to cause harm must be evaluated. Speech in general has the

157. Id. at 245.
158. THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 75 (1970).
159. See GREENAWALT, supra note 52, at 272-73.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 273.
162. See id. at 282, 286 n.6.
163. Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997) (quoting GREENAWALT,
supra note 52, at 85).
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potential for bringing about great harms, 164 both directly and
indirectly. 161 Such harms spawned by speech can involve the
substantive crime, such as murder, or a "secondary" crime, such as
conspiracy to commit murder. There can be no doubt that the Horn
and Saunders victims and their families have suffered tremendously.
Nor is there a question that Hit Man played a part in causing that

irreparable harm. The next, and more difficult, issue is to what extent
the harm inflicted by Perry, the murderer, may be imputed to the
publisher of the manual that enabled the crime. 166 Because Paladin is
morally culpable, the harms of these crimes are properly attributable

to its speech.
The harms generated by speech parallel those of the crime being

endorsed. Furthermore, the government has a compelling interest in
prevention of speech that will engender crime. 167 Information is
power; the knowledge of how to commit a crime provides perhaps the
single most important ingredient for the would-be criminal's plan. In

addition, it may give the future perpetrator the very idea and
encouragement needed to spur criminal activity.

The detailed

information in criminal instruction manuals is no different than the
details shared from individuals conspiring on a crime and should not
be treated differently.1 68 Perry could not have committed these
murders without Horn's detailed information about the family's
house and routine. 169 Likewise, he could not have killed the victims as
164. See C. Edwin Baker, Harm, Liberty, and Free Speech, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 979, 987
(1997). Baker notes that "[t]he seriousness of harms caused by speech should never be
underestimated" and lists racist speech, pornography, and negative or judgmental teachers'
speech as speech-inflicted harms. Id. at 987-88. Baker states that "[s]peech may be a more
serious cause of harm than criminal physical aggression," especially as it contributes to criminal
activity later in life. Id. On the other hand, Thomas Emerson maintains that expression devoid
of conduct is not even a social harm. See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward A General Theory of the
First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877 (1963). Emerson acknowledges that his theory may not
"afford adequate protection to the community interest in preserving internal order" but insists
that careful distinction between "expression" and "action" will resolve any problems. Id. at 932.
165. Speech causes harm directly in cases involving defamation, where the expression itself
causes the injury. See New York Times, Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Speech results in
harm more indirectly in cases like Rice where the expression substantially assists in creation of
harm but does not principally cause the physical injury.
166. See FEINBERG, supra note 136, at 232-43.
167. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 247 (noting that government can punish speech involved in crime
where the "government's interest in preventing the particular conduct at issue is
incontrovertibly compelling"); Emerson, supra note 164, at 931; Theresa J. Pulley Radwan, How
Imminent Is Imminent?: The Imminent Danger Test Applied to Murder Manuals, 8 SETON HALL
CONST. L.J. 47, 72 (1997).
16& See TRIBE, supra note 138, at 837 ("And the law need not treat differently the crime of
one man who sells a bomb to terrorists and that of another who publishes an instructional
manual for terrorists on how to build their own bombs out of old Volkswagen parts.").
169. See SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 69-72, 77-87.
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he did without the details, pictures, diagrams, and encouragement
found in Hit Man. In fact, at Perry's criminal trial, overwhelming

evidence and his own testimony showed that the book orchestrated
his every move. 70 As with tax evasion or drug manufacturing, the
crime cannot be committed without the knowledge and the
confidence that comes from instruction.
One might argue that the instructions and the encouragement to
commit a crime found in a manual like Hit Man do not create a "real"

harm because it is unknown if the book may even be read or followed
by any criminals. 7 1 But this "dormant" harm is no less a threat just
because it may be unknown to the victims. Mildred, Trevor, and
Janice were literally in mortal danger without ever knowing of Horn's
and Perry's plans. Such a dormant threat, like a timebomb, may be
more dangerous than a readily apparent threat because it cannot be
predicted or prevented until discovered, when it is already too late to
engage in counterspeech and to protect citizens from the evil planned.
In addition to the dangers from the principal harms incited in Hit
Man and similar manuals, there may also be numerous "secondary"
dangers that society is unwilling to tolerate. Even if the principal

harm never takes place, other punishable crimes may have already
occurred. If Perry had failed to kill Mildred, Trevor, and Janice, he
and Horn had nonetheless committed several serious offenses.

Devising a contract for murder and calculating a brutal triple
homicide violate the law. Conspiracy to break the law is just as much
a violation as is the substantive crime, whether tax evasion or drug
distribution, although that ultimate harm may be of a different
17 2
nature.
170. See id. at 64-67, 69-72; Kevin Simpson, Contract Murder: By the Man or by the Book?,
DENVER POST, Feb. 1, 1996, at B1.
171. See SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 261-62. In preparation for the civil trial, after losing in
the Fourth Circuit, Paladin surveyed 238 of 314 Hit Man readers to show, as a defense, that
people had bought the book largely for its entertainment value. Some customers reportedly
purchased it for assistance with writing projects, self-defense, law enforcement, or curiosity. See
id.
172. Some commentators believe that speech should be immune from regulation because
speech-based injuries are "less harmful" than other forms of conduct. See Michael D. Bayles,
Mid-Level Principles and Justification, in NOMOs XXVIII: JUSTIFICATION 49-67 (J. Roland
Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1986). Bayles notes that speech is "less likely to interfere
with the exercise of other liberties than is, say, liberty of action." Id. at 54; see also RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 200-03 (1977) (maintaining that the consequences of
expression are speculative as compared to the results of conduct and thus speech cannot be
regulated in the same manner as action); MARTIN H. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS 19 (1984). Professor Redish has written that "[it is almost certainly true in
the overwhelming majority of cases that speech is less immediately dangerous than conduct."
REDISH, supra note 172, at 19 n.48. Professor Schauer rejects this "lesser harm hypothesis" and
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Though substantial
harms
arise from speech,
some
commentators, like Professors C. Edwin Baker and David Dow,

believe that the speaker cannot be held accountable for the harms
encouraged or assisted by them but physically inflicted by other
parties. 173 Baker argues that speech cannot be regulated, despite any
harmful consequences, because the speaker and the listener174 are two
autonomous individuals.

75

To protect the speaker's autonomy and

desire for self-realization, she is entitled to freely "present her
viewpoint even if its assimilation by the listener leads to or constitutes
serious harm.

' 176

Controlling speech to prevent harm is justified only

when the resulting injury is not the consequence of an individual's
exercise of liberty.177
While Baker bases his theory on the rights of the speaker,

Professor Dow suggests that speech cannot be regulated because any
subsequent harms result from the listener's will and voluntary
decision to act.

78

Dow argues that the Brandenburg analysis rests on

the untenable notion that "words alone can overcome human will"
and thus denies the "potency" of an individual's selfdeterminations. 179 Because the First Amendment distinguishes
between speaking and physically doing something, the government
80
can regulate only overt conduct and never any underlying "trigger."'
To punish speech, Dow would require proof that the expression
literally overwhelmed and controlled the listener's will.181
Though Baker's and Dow's arguments have appeal, they fail to

recognize that the voluntary act of the listener does not necessarily
prevent imputing responsibility for the harm onto the speaker as well
finds that such a principle does not justify unlimited freedom of expression. See Frederick
Schauer, The Phenomenology of Speech and Harm, 103 ETHICs 635 (1993). Schauer notes that
speech acts are often necessary, but not always sufficient, conditions for subsequent harmful
acts. See id. at 642-43. Similarly though, certain conduct, such as the sale of a weapon, is often a
necessary, but rarely sufficient, condition to causing harmful acts. See id. at 643.
173. See Baker, supra note 164, at 991-97; David R. Dow, The Moral Failure of the Clear and
Present Danger Test, 6 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 733 (1998).
174. For this Comment, "listener" refers to the speaker's recipient who then becomes the
criminal actor.
175. See Baker, supra note 164, at 992-93.
176. Id. at 992.
177. See id. at 996-97.
178. See Dow, supra note 173, at 733-35, 748-49.
179. Id. at 734, 739.
180. Id. at 743-44.
181. See id. at 733-35, 748-49. Dow's proposed test for regulating speech requires that: (1)
the speaker's intent in expression was to cause injury, (2) the speech was a proximate cause of
the injury, and (3) the speaker, through the speech, did in fact overwhelm the listener's will. See
id.
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as the undoubtedly liable listener. 182 What Baker and Dow overlook
is that the harm can be attributed to the speaker, consistent with the
theories behind the American justice system, because that speaker is
morally culpable.83 There may be "room on the hook" for both
speaker and listener because, quite simply, both may be blameworthy
for the harm done. 184 Just because the listener chose to commit the
crime does not negate the fact that the speaker intentionally assisted
and encouraged the listener. 185 Why should the speaker enjoy
immunity from liability for a crime he or she purposefully helped
cause? The speaker's enjoyment of free speech should not be
limitless, especially where it engenders substantial harm. When
speech poses a serious public danger, the value of free speech may
not justify allowing the threat to persist.186
With Hit Man, there is no doubt that Lawrence Horn and James
Perry inflicted grave harm and that the manual's instructions and
exhortations to Perry enabled the injuries to occur. 8 7 The murders
are attributable, in part, to the assistance Hit Man provided, and
Paladin cannot be exonerated just because Horn and Perry are
already on the hook for their conduct. According to its own
stipulations for the summary judgment motion, Paladin admitted to
assisting Perry specifically and to intending for the book to assist
criminals to plan and execute contract murders. 88 Given these
admissions, Paladin is morally culpable, and the harmful
consequences of its speech can be imputed to it. The only remaining
question concerns what constitutional standard will allow punishment
of Paladin's morally culpable speech and yet protect the right to free
speech generally.

182. See FEINBURG, supra note 136, at 236-37.
183. See id. at 237-38. For example, if the speaker intentionally caused harm to a person (or
even caused it through reckless disregard of a known risk or gross negligence) that speaker
should be liable.
184. Id. at 237. Feinburg acknowledges that both speaker and listener may be blameworthy,
"though not necessarily in the same way or to the same degree." Id.
185. Feinburg is not alone in focusing on speaker's intent when analyzing the harms of
speech. The Brandenburg test also accounts for the speaker's intent when determining if the
speech should be regulated. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). Also, the Maryland civil aiding and
abetting laws at issue in Rice require a showing of the defendant's knowledge of his role in the
criminal activity. See Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
186. See Radwan, supra note 167, at 72-73.
187. See SMOLLA, supra note 1, at 64-67, 69-72.
188. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 241 (4th Cir. 1997).
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IV. A NEW FIRST AMENDMENT STANDARD FOR HIT MAN AND
CRIMINAL INSTRUCTION MANUALS

Hit Man and other criminal instruction manuals involve
significant societal damage and nonexpressive low-value speech.
When applied to such manuals, the Brandenburg test subordinates

societal interests in peace and safety to permit unfettered expressions
concerning the instruction of the methods of terror. 189 Courts must
strike a new balance in favor of protecting society from the dangers
generated by such manuals. There are many options for tests that
may enable us to properly exclude Hit Man from protection, yet

continue to afford protection to the vast majority of media speech.
This Comment will describe and analyze theories suggested by

Professor Sims, Professor Crump, Judge Edith Jones, and the opinion
of the Fourth Circuit in the Rice case itself before presenting the
standard that should govern Hit Man and criminal instruction
manuals like it.190
A.

An Overview of Four PossibleApproaches for Analyzing Hit
Man and CriminalInstruction Manuals

Professor Andrew Sims aspires to balance the interest in
protecting the media's role and the interest in remedying injured

parties.191 Sims offers a comprehensive approach for analyzing mediainjury cases such as Hit Man and other instruction manuals for

189. Other "how-to" manuals have not been subjected to the Brandenburg test either,
though those cases do not concern instructions facilitating the criminal acts of a third party. See
generally Winter v. G.P. Putnam's Sons, 938 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir. 1991) (book publisher not liable
when instructions in mushroom book lead to life-threatening illnesses in readers); Jones v. J.B.
Lippincott Co., 694 F. Supp. 1216 (D. Md. 1988) (textbook publisher not liable for injury from
use of directions on enema self-administration); Lewin v. McCreight, 655 F. Supp. 282 (E.D.
Mich. 1987) (metalworks instruction book publisher not liable for injuries resulting from
explosion during use of manual); Alm v. Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 1263 (I11.
App. Ct. 1985) (toolmaking book publisher not liable for injuries caused by shattering tool).
190. In addition to the four theories described in this Comment, other approaches abound.
For example, John L. Diamond and James L. Primm have suggested that media liability cases
could be treated like similar tort claims, because of the "intent to elicit action." John L.
Diamond & James L. Primm, Rediscovering Traditional Tort Typologies to Determine Media
Liability for PhysicalInjuries: From the Mickey Mouse Club to Hustler Magazine, 10 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 969, 996 (1988); see also Lise Vansen, Incitement by Any Other Name:
Dodging a FirstAmendment Misfire in Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc., 25 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 605, 627-34 (1998). In addition, Radwan (lamentably) argues that although the publishers
of Hit Man and similar publications lack a sufficient level of intent for criminal liability, they
should be liable under other causes of action requiring lower levels of intent. See Radwan,
supra note 167, at 47, 72-73.
191. See Sims, supra note 120, at 292.
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crime. 192 Sims suggests an ad hoc balancing test that has two levels of
analysis. 93 The first component concerns whether the speech at issue
is already "categorically unprotected by the First Amendment."'' 9
This threshold inquiry will automatically deny the First Amendment
defense to speech that falls into categories established as unprotected,
such as obscenity, fighting words, offering unlawful services, or
incitement to imminent unlawful activity. 195
The second level begins with an analysis of whether or not the
speech is entitled to a presumption of protection. 96 This balancing
approach offers a presumption of protection for the media defendant
to recognize its special place in our society. 97 That presumption may
then be weakened or strengthened by weighing certain factors, such
as the defendant's knowledge of likelihood of injury, the
identifiability of specific potential plaintiffs, and gravity of the
danger. 9 Following a determination that the speech is not entitled to
such a presumption, a court then considers two additional reasons for
extending First Amendment protection: the value of the expression
and any potential chilling effects. 199
While Sims would eliminate the Brandenburg test for advocacy
of illegal conduct for Hit Man-like cases, Professor David Crump
maintains that courts should continue to use the Brandenburg test but
should broaden the analysis to encompass expression that is
"camouflaged incitement. '' 200
Crump highlights categories of
"camouflaged incitement," including "inducement by 'recipes' for
violence,"201 where the speech does not technically satisfy the
elements of Brandenburg test but amounts to implicit advocacy of

192 See id. at 279-92.
193. See id.
194. Id. at 280-81.
195. See id.
196. See id. at 282.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 282-88. The other factors include: (1) how the listener became engaged in the
dangerous activity, (2) how obvious the danger was or should have been to the injured party,
and (3) whether the media defendant created the speech or only disseminated it. See id.
199. See id. at 288-92.
200. See David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts,
and the Borderlandof the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REV. 1, 1-6 (1994).
201. This category includes such cases where "defendant's depiction is so specific that it goes
beyond mere description-so that it supplies otherwise missing information needed to commit a
crime, provides a road map to the actors, or simply couples description with details that amount
to instructions." Id. at 33. Hit Man falls squarely within this definition and within Crump's
analysis.
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violence. 02 To avoid such close cases slipping through the holes of

the Brandenburgtest, a jury should consider as a matter of fact, case
by case, whether the defendant's expression was "incitement" - a
decision that is then reviewable by the court. 203 Such a contextual,
practical, and reality-based analysis of incitement would likely
envelop criminal instruction manuals, such as Hit Man, and might
account for society's need for social order and the substantial harms
24

posed by such manuals. 0
Accounting for the same interests Crump and Sims sought to
balance, Judge Edith Jones presents a simpler ad hoc approach in her
concurring and dissenting opinion in Herceg v. Hustler Magazine,
Inc. 2 5 Herceg involved a civil suit filed after the death of a teenaged
boy who unsuccessfully attempted autoerotic asphyxia after reading a
detailed article about the sexual practice in Hustler magazine.2°6 The
court applied the Brandenburg standard and held the article entitled
to full First Amendment protection. 20 7 Jones argues that, due to the
novelty of the case, the court should have balanced the state's interest
in protecting life against Hustler's expressive interest, considering the

content, First Amendment value, and detail of the speech. 208
The previous methods focused on the First Amendment
treatment of speech itself, but the Fourth Circuit court in Rice based
its decision on the speech-act doctrine. 209 The speech-act doctrine

recognizes that speech that is "an integral part of a transaction
involving conduct the government otherwise is empowered to

prohibit" can be regulated. 210 Under this theory, because the speech
202. See id. at 33-39.
203. See id. at 49-69. Crump suggests that fact-finders and reviewing courts use the
following factors in their determination: (1) the expression itself, (2) the pattern of the
expression, including anything that may have multiple or coded meanings, (3) the context,
(4) the predictability and seriousness of possible consequences, (5) the speaker's knowledge of
the likelihood of violent consequences, (6) the availability of equally sufficient means of
expression that lack advocacy of violent conduct, (7) any presence of disclaimers, and (8) any
existence of "serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 51-69.
204. See Vansen, supra note 190, at 626-27, 633-34.
205. See 814 F.2d 1017, 1025-30 (5th Cir. 1987) (Jones, J., concurring and dissenting).
206. See id. at 1018-19.
207. See id. at 1020-24.
208. See id. at 1026-28; Jeffrey Haag, If Words Could Kill: Rethinking Tort Liability in Texas
for Media Speech That Incites Dangerousor Illegal Activity, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1421, 1462
(1999). Jones models her approach after the Supreme Court's analysis in Dun & Bradstreet,Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), where the Court encountered a novel First
Amendment question and responded by balancing the state and constitutional interests. See
Herceg, 814 F.2d at 1027-29.
209. See Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128 F.3d 233, 243-47 (4th Cir. 1997).
210. Id. at 246 (quoting DOJ REPORT, supra note 98).
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is so "instrumental in and intertwined with" criminal activity, it loses
its First Amendment protection. 21' The court noted specifically that
speech constituting criminal aiding and abetting is not entitled to
protection.21 2 The court then extended that principle to civil aiding
and abetting, at least in the Hit Man scenario where the defendant
intended to assist and encourage criminal conduct and did so through
speech that is not abstract advocacy.2" 3
Although the Fourth Circuit arrived at the constitutionally
appropriate conclusion in the Rice case by holding Hit Man to be
unprotected, its reliance on the speech-act doctrine was misplaced.
First and foremost, Hit Man is not a speech-act; it is simply speech.
Paladin's only conduct was publishing a book, and publication has
long been considered an exercise of the freedoms of speech and the
press, at the core of the First Amendment. 214 Furthermore, the
speech-act doctrine applies where the "speech is brigaded with
25
action," such as when one falsely shouts fire in a crowded theatre.
In the Hit Man scenario, Paladin's speech is not brigaded with its own
actions, but with James Perry's actions. Hit Man was indeed integral
to Perry's crimes, but that connection does not transform a book into
21 6
conduct absent more participation by the publisher.
The tests recommended by Professors Sims and Crump and
211. Id. at 245 (quoting United States v. Mendelsohn, 896 F.2d 1183, 1186 (9th Cir. 1990)).
212. See id. at 242-47; United States v. Barnett, 667 F.2d 835, 842-43 (9th Cir. 1982).
213. See Rice, 128 F.3d. at 243. The Fourth Circuit had held Brandenburg inapplicable
because Hit Man is devoid of expression or advocacy and because it "constitutes the archetypal
example of speech" that sheds its protection by "methodically and comprehensively prepar[ing]
and steel[ing] its audience to specific criminal conduct through exhaustively detailed
instructions on the planning, commission, and concealment of criminal conduct." Id. at 256.
The court did not openly engage in balancing, but it did stress the form of Hit Man, namely its
graphic, nonexpressive, and instructive content, Paladin's overt purpose in publishing the
manual, and the state's interest in preventing murder. See id. at 247-65.
214. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
215. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
216. An example of how Paladin's speech might qualify as a speech-act would be if Paladin
held a meeting or seminars for would-be contract killers that involved both the book and
additional activity. See United States v. Freeman, 761 F.2d 549 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding
defendant liable for teaching methods of tax evasion at seminars although his speech involved
some political and ideological content); United States v. Kelley, 769 F.2d 215 (4th Cir. 1985)
(holding defendant liable where he provided information and assistance on the filing of false W4 forms and also provided the forms); see also United States v. Aguilar, 883 F.2d 662 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding no First Amendment defense applicable where defendants instructed alien
where and how to cross the border illegally); United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.
1987) (no constitutional defense where defendant helped arrange and maintain illegal tax
shelters).
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Judge Jones do analyze Hit Man as speech, but they fail to strike a
proper balance between the First Amendment and societal interests.
The Sims and Crump approaches involve complicated balancing
exercises with multiple factors and may be confusing to a fact-finder.
In general, ad hoc balancing "frames issues in such a broad and
undefined way... that it can hardly be described as a rule of law at
all."' 7 The suggested tests make it difficult for a court to maintain
efficiency and to contain "unruly forces that seek to destroy a system
of free expression.' 1 8 Ad hoc analysis cannot guarantee that
sufficient weight is awarded to the special interest in free speech; a
definitional or categorical approach can more reliably "balance with
'a thumb on the scales' in favor of speech. ' 219
Most significantly, the proposed standards lack the critical
requirement of the speaker's specific intent to instruct and encourage
criminal activity. Sims and Crump weigh the speaker's knowledge in
their factor balancing tests, but they fail to emphasize actual intent,
which should be a dispositive element in determining protection for a
criminal instruction manual. Intent proves a "necessary distinction"
between the morally culpable speaker, like Paladin, and the speaker
whose words were misused or imitated in a criminal act.22° This intent
requirement alleviates the problem of punishing useful or valuable
speech and eliminates the feared chilling effect on the dissemination
of such speech by the media. 22' Such a heightened intent requirement
will also protect the preeminent values of the First Amendment
because the balancing scales have already been tipped in their favor;
free speech will not be outweighed until the state's interest is
222
indisputable and implicates a morally culpable speaker.
B.

The Proper Standardfor Analysis: A CategoricalBalancing Test
for Hit Man and Similar CriminalInstruction Manuals

A proper test for determining the constitutional protection for
Hit Man and similar manuals must balance the substantial state
interests in preventing crime against the scant First Amendment
217. Emerson, supra note 164, at 912-14.
21& Id. at 913.
219. Redish, supra note 149, at 624.
220. Sandra Davidson, Blood Money: When Media Expose Others to Risk of Bodily Harm,
19 HASTING COMM. & ENT. L.J. 225, 305-06 (1997); see also Rice v. Paladin Enters., Inc., 128
F.3d 233, 247-48, 265-67 (4th Cir. 1997).
221. See Rice, 128 F.3d at 247.
222. See id.
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value found in such materials. Taking these interests into account,
the standard must focus on the form and purpose of the speech at
issue. The following three-pronged test captures the interests in free
speech, yet permits liability for culpable speakers.
This categorical test avoids the problems associated with ad hoc
balancing, presents efficient rules for the courts to apply, and
safeguards freedom of speech. As noted earlier, a primary element is
the speaker's specific intent to assist, instruct, and encourage
activity. 23 To impose liability, the test next requires that the
speaker's intent had been to promote and instruct criminal conduct.
This second prong represents the state's interests in preventing
crimes, particularly heinous crimes like murder. The final element is
that the speech assisting criminal activities must have taken an
instructional, nonexpressive form, virtually devoid of "political,
informational, educational, entertainment, or other wholly legitimate
purpose. 22 4 This element promotes First Amendment interests by
protecting speech that actually contains expression and preventing a
chilling effect on such valued expression. If a book or some other
material satisfies all three of these elements, it is not entitled to First
Amendment protection, and the publisher may be held liable for the
criminal use of the instruction as intended.
CONCLUSION

The right to free speech is not, nor has it ever been, absolute.
Speech that furthers core First Amendment values and that benefits
society should be protected. The Hit Man manual, and similar
criminal instruction manuals, are not supported by traditional
justifications for freedom of expression, nor are they harmless. The
Fourth Circuit correctly recognized that Brandenburgdoes not apply
to these graphic instructional manuals for crime. Defendants, even
book publishers, may use speech as a means of aiding and abetting
criminal conduct, but they will no longer receive automatic impunity
for that speech.
223. This intent to assist criminality will likely be hard to demonstrate. Intent can be shown
by inference from the content and circumstances of the speech but will still be nearly impossible
to prove. See id. at 266-67. However, this challenging requirement is to be embraced-it
ensures free speech unless culpable persons can be exposed.
224. Id. at 266.
"Nonexpressive instructional speech would be dealt with through
application of a test similar to those developed for conduct and commercial speech." Isaac
Molnar, Resurrectingthe Bad Tendency Test to Combat InstructionalSpeech: Militias Beware, 59
OHIO ST. L.J. 1333, 1371, 1375 (1998).
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Hit Man, as a training manual for the methods of terror, is not
entitled to First Amendment protection. To fairly impose liability on
media speakers like Paladin, without chilling the media in general, the
courts must replace the Brandenburgtest with a test that will promote
society's interests in safety. The test suggested here emphasizes the
specific intent of the speaker to instruct and assist criminal activity
through speech that is non-expressive and devoid of First
Amendment value. Under such a standard, if a criminal uses an
instruction manual like Hit Man the way it was intended to be used,
the publisher cannot hide under the shield of the First Amendment.

